branding is important, yo!

these days old onion articles are prophecy and new onion articles cant even give me a raised eyebrow.

this is/does both.

as a followup to how useful your visualization is, I have started spreading comments across a wider selection of instance communities.

this is something I have considered before, but your visulazation made the possible utility and usefulness of doing so much more “real”.

this is really, really interesting. thank you for this.

instance reach and relationships are pretty wild and I can see this helping people to mix up their communities between instances.

the tight groupings of some instance communities might be source of pride or distress, depending.

would be nice to select a community and query its n closest overlap neighbors or all neighbors within a certain distance.

very cool project.

as is traditional, one of our corporate innovators seeks to protect citizens (never simply consumers, no, no!) with a defensive patent - sure to now be locked away in a safe until natural corporate patent expiration 1000 years hence.

now and forevermore we shalll sing in praise of this beneficent corporate citizen and their efficacious lawyerly thrust deep into the heart of our once inevitable (but now vanquished) future boring dystopia of ads beamed directly into our brains 24/7.

the Rust kernel could be many years away from being finished.

the number I saw floating around was 3 years to production useful. regardless, C’s end days as the go-to, large systems level language are drawing nigh.

edit: tear

no worries.

the net effect of client separation is that your device sees no other layer 2 devices on the wlan besides the gateway. this would typically be enforced at the frame level by the APs and is separate from any radio privacy cryptography.

a properly configured wireless setup would assume every client is compromised and would also disallow local client-client via source routing or proxy ARP or any other escape options. 100% secure? probably not, but its a non trivial barrier that would have to be circumvented.

as with e.g. broken WEP years ago, there are still options to mess with clients at ~Layer 1 but I dont believe its currently as trivial as it used to be.

most properly configured public wifi will enable client separation, of course that potentially still leaves lower level protocol and radio attacks.

that thing you do when you are absolutely, positively, without a doubt, 100% sure you can fuck shit up even more.

…that wireless mac is looking suspiciously shopped and non-existent.

md5 has been broken for years, but thats pretty damn cool scary.

deleted by creator

a trap at every turn.

couldnt read the whole article, but I would say, this is an “oh, fuck.” moment for a lot of people

The FBI tries and cannot unlock a recent phone. they allegedly turn to a private company for emergency access and they are in within hours(?)

I think many people should reevaluate their threat model and mitigations after this. perhaps this changes nothing for you. perhaps it changes everything for you.

We don’t have any evidence for this statement, and we can never prove the negative (that a device is absolutely secure).

does anyone have info on crooks’s phone make/model (and an OS version guess)? I have not seen this anywhere and, if it is not already in the public domain, why?

FBI says they got the phone contents in the clear. that gives some boundsfor both known (easy) potential compromises and “oh, fuck.”

edit: typo

edit 2: still no detail but I found this…

The phone was a relatively new model, which can be harder for law enforcement to access than old phones because of newer software, according to technology experts. In many federal investigations, it can take hours, weeks or months to open a suspect’s phone.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2024/07/16/thomas-crooks-phone-motive-parents-trump-shooting/

unless this information is now a state secret, we may learn more.

I know this may be pedantic, but

it’s just that the newer phones are secure… For now.

that statement suggests that other recovery techniques (e.g. hardware decaping, state zero-days, etc), dont already make absolutely current devices insecure.

it would not surprise me that a TLA with physical access could not recover enclave information and completely expose naked storage in 2 days or less - its just a matter of how urgent is. a former president nearly loosing their head might count as pretty damn urgent. meddle with the us power structure and it will protect itself - if not the particular individuals.

if you noticed any power dips in your area right after the attempt on trump, that was probably the local NSA cluster firing up.

so it got backdoored, or QA is trash or both at the same time. hate it when CI builds come so fast you cant verify the latest shipping rootkit

ONE OF US! ONE OF US!

but seriously, modern FOSS distros (yes, debian is modern, damnit!) are amazingly good. you have an exceptionally high probablility of switching and staying switched.

phew! good thing I still have a few 386sx AMI BIOS boards handy. no ones shopping around zero days on those anymore, right?